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Learners and Judicial 
Oversight:
Progeny of Castañeda
Lenford C. Sutton, Luke Cornelius,
and Robyn McDonald-Gordon
Introduction
When the 93rd Congress enacted the Equal Education Opportu-
nity Act of 1974 (EEOA), it required states to take appropriate action 
to overcome language barriers that inhibited equal education par-
ticipation by their resident students.1  An examination of the EEOA 
legislative testimony suggests elected officials established the law 
to set forth provisions to secure the legal rights of English Language 
Learners (ELLs).2  In 1981, the Fifth Circuit Court in Castañeda v. 
Pickard created a three-pronged, science-based test that required 
English language assistance programs for ELLs to: (1) be based on 
sound educational theory; (2) have adequate resources for program 
implementation; and (3) provide continuous assessment to deter-
mine if students’ English language deficits are being addressed.3   
From 1996 to 2006, while the total U.S. school population in-
creased by slightly less than 3%, the ELL population increased more 
than 60%. The largest increases in ELL students occurred in the 
Southeast, Midwest, and mountain areas of the West. During the 
same time period, over 80% of ELLs cited Spanish as their first lan-
guage, with the remaining 20% citing over 400 different languages 
as their native tongue.4 
 Given the exponential increase in the number of students 
enrolled in English language acquisition programs and the education 
spending priorities required in the aftermath of the global eco-
nomic recession in 2008, an examination of the state of education 
provisions for ELLs is appropriate. Moreover, 30 years have passed 
since the federal court issued the Castañeda three-part test as a 
mechanism to assess the probative value of instructional programs 
earmarked for ELLs. Therefore, a review of judicial declarations since 
these principles were established is warranted. Accordingly, this 
article is divided into four sections. The first section provides an 
overview of case law and federal statutes which set forth provision 
for ELLs. This section also reviews civil challenges which asked 
the courts to interpret the “sound educational theory” tenet of the 
Castañeda test over the last three decades. The second section 
reviews the United States Supreme Court’s most recent ruling 
Horne v. Flores5  and Rufo v. Suffolk County,6  a leading case which 
illustrates the pragmatics of Rule 60 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure7 as applied in Horne. The third section contains a 
brief description of state funding for ELL programs. The final section 
of the article discusses implications of the high court’s decision to 
set aside court-imposed sanctions on Arizona lawmakers, remand-
ing the case back to its original jurisdiction; and what this decision 
means for the future of language acquisition programs three decades 
after Castañeda.
Equal Education Opportunity for English Language Learners
In 1923, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Meyer v. 
Nebraska that when the government attempts to restrict classroom 
instruction to the English language, parents have a right to influence 
what their children actually learn.8  On May 17, 1954, the Court de-
livered its monumental ruling in Brown v. Board of Education which 
affirmed education as a fundamental right. The Court explained:
Today education is perhaps the most important function 
of state and local governments. Compulsory school at-
tendance laws and great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educa-
tion to our democratic society…In these days, it is doubt-
ful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all 
on equal terms.9 
In addition to its impact on school segregation, Brown served as 
the catalyst for revolutionary change in almost every facet of Ameri-
can society. Ultimately, the case would serve as a useful resource 
for parents seeking equal educational opportunity for ELLs. Accord-
ingly, advocates have a well-documented history of utilizing the 
American judicial system to secure favorable rulings which support 
equal educational opportunities for these children.  
Hence, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the chief agency as-
signed to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which 
forbids discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in 
programs receiving federal dollars, provided a clear mandate to all 
school districts.10  On May 25, 1970, J. Stanley Pottinger, Director 
of the OCR issued a memorandum directing school districts to 
take steps to help ELLs overcome language barriers to ensure their 
meaningfully participation in all educational programs.11  The OCR’s 
directive was bolstered in 1974 when the U.S. Supreme Court de-
clared in Lau v. Nichols that meaningful learning opportunities were 
not established by providing students with similar learning environ-
ments; rather, school districts needed to take affirmative steps to 
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ensure a meaningful learning experience for all students.12  In 1985, 
William A. Smith, Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights of the 
OCR, issued a second directive to school districts explaining the 
constructs it would apply to determine if local learning communi-
ties were in compliance with the federal laws. These included: (a) 
whether there is actually a need for the district to provide an alter-
native program to serve LEP students and (b) whether the program 
is likely to effectively meet the educational needs of its ELLs.13  A 
third OCR directive was issued in 1991 which formally adopted the 
benchmarks established by the Fifth Circuit Court in Castañeda v. 
Pickard14  which required language assistance programs for English 
Language Learners (ELLs) to meet the three-pronged test described 
earlier.15 
Shortly after Lau, the EEOA, which requires states to take ap-
propriate action to eliminate language barriers which impeded the 
equal participation of ELLs in educational programs, was enacted.16  
Subsequent legal challenges to existing programs for ELLs and court 
application of the Castañeda test placed the burden on plaintiff-
parents to demonstrate the inappropriateness of language assistance 
programs by proving the lack of sound educational theory to sup-
port the program in question.  
Later civil challenges to the constitutionality of ELL programs 
interpreted the sound educational theory aspect of  the Castañeda  
three-part test and placed the burden upon plaintiffs to prove the 
unsoundness of the education theory which served as the founda-
tion for a school districts’ language acquisition program. In its delib-
erations in U.S. v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court applied the “sound 
educational theory” element of Castañeda test when reviewing 
the expert testimony provided by both plaintiffs and defendants.17   
The court observed that plaintiff testimony contained a substan-
tial number of expert witnesses who concurred with the court’s 
initial finding that bilingual education program, adopted in 1973, 
was pedagogically unsound while the state (defendant) provided 
a single expert witness whose level of expertise remained uncer-
tain throughout the testimony given.18  Consequently, the court 
concluded that, at a minimum, some of the programs designed to 
help students overcome language barriers were deficient; however, 
the court did not make clear the level or quality of evidence they 
applied to declare that plaintiffs had in fact demonstrated that an 
unsound theory was has at the core of program.19  Moreover, the 
court refused to explain how defendants might successfully respond 
to the abundance of testimony provided by plaintiffs.
Fifteen years later in Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education, 
the Seventh Circuit Court declared, “...courts should accord school 
districts the same deference that they accord administrative agen-
cies.”20  More specifically, “...under the Administrative Procedures 
Act, administrative agencies are presumed to possess expertise in 
their field and to be acting within the scope of their authority.”21 
Applying this nuanced level of scrutiny, the court attempted to 
balance the need to "protect the plaintiffs' interests in obtaining 
equal educational opportunities (through the elimination of language 
barriers)" and the requirement that courts not "substitute our sup-
positions for the expert knowledge of educators or our judgment 
for the educational and political decisions reserved to the state and 
local agencies.”22  Because the plaintiffs in U.S. v. Texas and Gomez 
believed each language acquisition program to be educationally 
sound, the soundness of the education theory behind each program 
was not fully addressed in either case. 
In Teresa P. v. Berkley Unified School District,23  the District Court 
for the Northern District of California embraced the Castañeda 
“sound educational theory” test and acknowledged the decision 
in Gomez. In its nuanced standard of scrutiny, however, the court 
openly referenced only the second part of the Gomez rationale 
when it declared that "...courts should not substitute their educa-
tional values and theories" for those best left to educational author-
ities and experts.24  The court’s declaration essentially presumed that 
the school district’s language acquisition program was educationally 
sound. The court concluded: 
After reviewing the evidence presented in this case, this 
Court concludes that the plaintiffs have not met their 
burden to show that the Berkeley Unified School Districts’ 
program is not pedagogically sound [Italics added]. In fact, 
the evidence shows that the educational theories, upon 
which the BUSDs programs are grounded, are manifestly 
as sound as any theory identified by plaintiffs. Although 
plaintiffs advocate a program that emphasizes native 
tongue instruction, they introduced no objective evidence 
demonstrating that the efficacy of this approach, whatever 
it may be, for teaching LEP students English, or help-
ing them succeed in a mainstream environment, renders 
the alternative programs preferred by the Berkley Unified 
School District pedagogically unsound.25 
The legal record is uncertain about the quality of testimony pro-
vided by the plaintiffs in this case; however, the court did declare 
that "...the District's special language services were based upon 
sound theories, were appropriately implemented, and produced 
positive results in teaching LEP students."26  The court record indi-
cated that the court relied upon witnesses for the defendant school 
district, qualified as education experts who provided testimony 
grounded in their own personal experience with the school cited in 
the litigation. Even more strikingly, the court did not reveal the facts 
it utilized to determine the qualification of the experts provided by 
the school district, nor did it enunciate the actual education theory 
upon which the school district established its language acquisi-
tion program, merely stating that the program was based on sound 
education theory. However, the court did assert: 
The structure and design of the District's elementary ESL 
program is based upon factors that include: diversity of 
language backgrounds; adherence to parental preferences, 
where possible, either for placement in regular mainstream 
classrooms, the ESL program, or in bilingual classrooms; 
and school district educational policies that foster integra-
tion and heterogeneity.27 
The court provided no comments about the quality of the wit-
nesses nor did it make any attempt to weight the value of opposing 
testimony; rather, it merely offered platitudes which reinforced the 
presumption of sound theory granted to school district programs.
In Valeria G. v. Wilson, the plaintiff ELLs attempted to halt the 
implementation of state of California’s controversial Proposition 227 
which declared that language deficient student “...shall be taught 
English by being taught in English."28  In effect, ELLs would obtain 
up to one year of language acquisition services and mainstreamed 
into classrooms where they would receive their instruction in Eng-
lish only. The plaintiffs asserted the program was not supported by 
sound educational theory or education experts and claimed it to be 
an egregious violation of §1703f of the Equal Education Opportunity 
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Act of 1974 for its failure to meet the three-pronged test outlined in 
Castañeda. The legal record indicates that plaintiffs provided expert 
testimony to persuade the court that the immersion program under 
Proposition 227 was not a sound means to provide any instruction 
to ELLs while the defendant school district provided its own experts 
who testified that immersion programs were successfully used in-
ternationally.29  The court responded to opposing testimony stating 
that “...it is apparent that the state of the art in the area of language 
remediation [is] such that respected authorities legitimately differ as 
to the best type of educational program for limited English speaking 
students.”30 For that reason, the court decided it was inappropri-
ate to choose between the divergent points of view concerning 
language acquisition. The court’s inaction in Valeria G. signaled to 
future litigants in similar civil challenges that a school district’s lan-
guage acquisition program could only be declared out of compliance 
with the EEOA, via Castañeda, when plaintiffs could prove that no 
experts supported the underlying educational theory of the program 
in question, an extremely high standard for plaintiffs to meet.
 
U.S. Supreme Court and English Language Learners
The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB),31 and, 
more specifically, the English Learner Acquisition Act (ELAA)32   
contain provisions which endorse parental participation and expand-
ed education options for program delivery. However, the 30 year 
progeny of case law associated with the Castañeda three-pronged 
test has reduced the ability of ELL parents to influence the quality 
of educational opportunities afforded to their children, especially 
when they are not satisfied with the instructional methods, as was 
the issue when the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Horne 
v. Flores.33 
In 1992, the Nogales school district, situated on the Arizona-
Mexico border, served over 6,000 K12 students of whom 30% were 
ELLs. In that same year, students and parents sued under the EEOA, 
claiming the state of Arizona was not taking appropriate action to 
provide English language instruction for ELLs within the Nogales 
school district. At the heart of the parents’ complaint was Nogales’ 
bilingual education program where students not fluent in English 
were taught to read and speak English; yet a majority of their 
classes were delivered in their native language. For that reason, the 
school district’s expenditures on teacher salaries increased signifi-
cantly in order to hire personnel capable of teaching a variety of 
subjects in Spanish as well as teachers to teach English. In Janu-
ary 2000, the Federal District Court ruled the bilingual education 
program ineffective because Arizona’s funding for English learners 
was arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the state to come up 
with a plan to adequately fund the education of ELLs in the state 
of Arizona. Initially, the court ordered the state to fix this fund-
ing problem in Nogales, but upon further examination and at the 
request of the Arizona attorney general who was concerned with 
state uniformity law for its school districts, the court later ordered 
the state to provide additional funding in every other district in the 
state. When the Arizona legislature refused to make the appropria-
tion in support of ELL programs, the court levied large fines over 
several years in attempt to enforce the original court order. Entan-
gled in partisan conflict, the Arizona attorney general and gover-
nor refused to defend the defiance of its legislature; therefore, the 
speaker of the house and president of the Arizona senate intervened 
and moved for relief from the court’s judgment in light of newly 
adopted H.B. 206434  and Rule 60(b) (5) under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.35 
  
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is a 
vital component of institutional reform litigation, allows a litigant to 
ask a federal court to grant relief from a decree when:
 ...the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application or 
simply the when judgment is no longer in the public inter-
est [emphasis added] or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application or simply 
the when judgment is no longer in the public interest.36  
Institutional reform litigation involves cases in which a federal 
court order is issued to remedy past violations of federal law. The 
orders generally remain in effect for an extended period time and 
extend deeply into matters traditionally relegated to state control. 
Moreover, orders issued in such cases often serve a very important 
purpose but may effectuate problematic circumstances. 
For example, one of the leading cases pertaining to Rule 60(b)5 is 
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County in which the inmates of a Boston 
jail sued state correction officials and local politicians for violation of 
their constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment, a manifestation of the sleeping conditions within the correc-
tional facility.37 The First District Court of Appeals ruled in favor of 
the inmates, and both parties entered into a consent decree which 
authorized the construction of a new correctional facility which 
would provide single sleeping areas for inmates whose cases had 
not gone to trial. Consistent with the court’s judgment, the facility’s 
construction was planned but the project was delayed for several 
months. In the interim, the number of inmates to be housed grew 
exponentially and prompted respondents to request an amend-
ment to the original decree permitting double bunking of inmates, 
effectively expanding the capacity of the correctional facility. The 
district court denied the motion, and the Circuit Court of Appeals 
confirmed; however, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review the lower court proceedings. 
The primary issue before the high court in Rufo was the applica-
tion of the appropriate standard for resolving a disputed request 
to modify a judgment accepted by officials representing the public 
interest. Respondents asserted that such judgment should be modi-
fied if there is a change in circumstances since the enactment of the 
judgment which is adversely impacting the functionality of public 
institutions. For example, Massachusetts state law requires the Suf-
folk Sherriff and state Commissioner of Correction to agree on in-
trafacility inmate transfers. However, the single cell provision within 
the decree obligated both to approve transfers counter to their 
professional judgment. As a result, Suffolk County inmates were 
transferred from the newer facility into extremely overcrowded state 
correctional facilities at a shared cost of one million dollars annually. 
Secondly, there are instances when the local sheriff may not have 
a significant number of inmates eligible for transfer to state correc-
tional facilities primarily because Massachusetts law requires trans-
fers only for pretrial detainees who have served a previous sentence 
for felony convictions. If the number of convicted felons within the 
jail is minimal and the facility is at capacity, the sheriff must then 
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submit a list of inmates being held on bail to a superior court judge. 
The judge will then select inmates from the list and release them on 
their own recognizance so that they may be transferred to a half-
way house; a less secure facility. The net result is a perversion of 
the Massachusetts bail statutes primarily because it releases inmates 
on recognizance who would otherwise be forced to post bail to se-
cure their own release, assuring favorable probability for their court 
appearance at the designated time. As a result, the Suffolk County 
sheriff requested permission to institute double-bunking in order to 
minimize the adverse impact on the local public institutions while 
honoring all other provisions of the initial decree. In its rejection of 
the sheriff’s request, the district court invoked a modified version 
of the “grievous wrong” standard which states that a court should 
only modify a consent decree upon a clear showing of a grievous 
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions.    
In its reversal of the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court elimi-
nated the application of the grievous wrong standard in modify-
ing consent decrees related to institutional reform litigation. More 
specifically, the high court in Rufo ruled that the “grievous wrong” 
language of United States v. Swift was “...not intended to take on a 
talismanic quality, warding off virtually all efforts to modify consent 
decrees."39 Institutional reforms litigation like Rufo Rule 60(b)5 pro-
vides respondents with a means to ask a federal court to reconsider 
an order to determine if it has become archaic or inappropriate due 
to changed circumstances, such as a change in governing law.40  
Changed Circumstance in Arizona 
Horne hardly stands as an exemplar of institutional reform litiga-
tion. Begun in 1992, the case did not proceed to trial and verdict, 
respectively, until 1999 and 2000.41  Also, even though the original 
defendants did not appeal the U.S. District Court’s 2000 ruling 
and order to improve funding, the state of Arizona failed to take 
any compliance action in the ensuing five years. It was only at the 
point at which the court began imposing fines, ultimately exceeding 
$20 million, that the state legislature finally acted, passing House 
Bill 2064 in 2006.42 Even then, the state was far from unified in its 
support for this proposed solution. The governor, who had vetoed 
similar measures previously, refused to sign the bill, and both the 
state attorney general and state board of education also declined to 
support relief from the 2000 court order based on this legislation. In 
the end, the legislature itself was forced to intervene to seek relief 
under Rule 60(b)(5). Additionally, the legislature sought relief from 
the decision of the court to apply its original order statewide, which 
it had done at the state attorney general’s request.43 
The grounds for the sought-for relief were varied. The respon-
dents argued that between 2000 and 2006 there had been several 
substantive changes in ELL education in Arizona due to develop-
ments at the local, state, and national levels. Locally, a new superin-
tendent had revamped instruction in all areas, including ELL, by pro-
moting greater efficiency and thus allowing for improvements such 
as reduced class sizes and increased teacher support. At the state 
level, it was argued that the state had abandoned bilingual educa-
tion, the system that had been declared to be inadequately funded, 
with “Structured English Immersion (SEI).” This change  was then 
ratified into law as part of H.B. 2064.44  This change also followed 
a significant change in the formulas for funding ELL education in 
Arizona. Yet another key change was passage of the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). NCLB provided significant increases 
in Title III funding for ELL programs, which Arizona then used to 
meet the court-mandated increases in state funding. Additionally, 
NCLB strengthened the EEOA’s preference for greater state control 
over all aspects of the educational program, including ELL programs. 
NCLB also stated a belief of the Congress and the President that 
improved educational outcomes could be based on improved edu-
cational methods as opposed to additional funding. Finally, it was 
argued that the Nogales school district, at the heart of the original 
litigation, had experienced a significant increase in funding over the 
intervening years. Although the incremental funding at issue in the 
original court order had not increased at the rate envisioned in the 
order, the respondents argued that this overall increase in funding 
for the school district, coupled with local reforms, had created a 
sufficiently funded and educationally sound ELL program. 
Both the district court and the ninth circuit rejected the legisla-
ture’s motion for relief. In interpreting Rule 60(b)(5), they relied on 
the previous doctrines in Rufo and Swift to determine when a court 
order may be modified or dismissed by “changed circumstances.” 
In noting that the state had not significantly increased incremental 
funding for ELL instruction, but had merely used federal funds under 
NCLB to supplant state funding, these courts concluded that there 
had been no substantial change in state funding of ELL as pre-
scribed in the original order. These courts also placed great reliance 
on the fact that the original order had been uncontested by the 
state and that neither the legislature nor the current state superin-
tendent were among the named parties in the original case, thus 
raising issues of their standing to challenge the 2000 order. 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed these rulings and 
directed the lower courts to reconsider the state’s request for relief 
under Rule 60(b)(5).45  Although the Court did not directly order 
any relief from the 2000 order, it did find that both the district and 
circuit courts had failed to appropriately address the respondents’ 
contention of changed circumstances. It argued that, especially 
in the context of institutional reform at the state level, concerns 
regarding federalism and the intrusion of federal courts into state 
functions argued for a more flexible application of the changed 
circumstances of Rule 60(b)(5). The Court was especially criti-
cal of the lower courts’ focus on the state’s incremental funding 
of ELL education in Nogales to the exclusion of other factors and 
considerations that might indicate changed circumstances. It noted 
that the respondents had provided persuasive evidence that the ELL 
situation in Nogales, and the rest of the state, was substantially 
different from that in 2000. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, 
asserted that each of the changes cited by the respondents could 
be taken as substantially changed circumstances in their own right 
as well as collectively. The Court found that the changes in local 
school policies, coupled with the adoption of SEI, meant that the 
ELL program in the Nogales school district in 2009 was significantly 
different from that in 1992 or 2000. It also found that NCLB/ELAA 
had constituted a change in law that inherently placed a greater 
emphasis on state control of ELL programs and a reduced empha-
sis on funding in educational improvement. The Court considered 
the substantial increase in funding available for ELL programs in 
Nogales, regardless of source, to be a significant change in circum-
stance. In making its ruling, the Court found that the lower courts 
had taken a far too narrow view of changed circumstances, focusing 
more on the state’s limited response to the district court’s 2000 
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decree order than the circumstances that had led to the decree in 
the first place.46  
With regard to the other matters raised in Horne, the Court 
accepted the intervention of the state superintendent of public in-
struction as sufficient to establish standing for the challenge to the 
court order.47 In this, the Court may have established an important 
precedent, if one somewhat peripheral to this analysis, regarding 
the growing trend of specific executive officers at the state level 
refusing to affirmatively defend legislative enactments with which 
they personally and politically disagree. Additionally, the Court ruled 
that the failure of the state to appeal the initial district court order 
in 2000 had no effect on the respondent’s ability to invoke the rules 
of civil procedure to seek relief from that order. The Court found 
Table
States with Funding for English Language Learner Programs:  1999 and 2009
State

































New Hampshire x x
New Jersey x x
New Mexico x x
New York x x
North Carolina x x
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rcd/BE020932/State_Survey_of_Legislative_Re.pdf.;  and Deborah A. Verstegen and Teresa S. Jordan, “State Public Education Finance Systems 
and Funding Mechanisms for Special Populations,” a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Education Finance Associa-
tion, March 2010, Richmond, VA.
the trial court had erred when it, with the acquiescence of the 
state attorney general, extended its order to every school district in 
the state despite a lack of any evidence showing similar violation 
elsewhere and the fact the all of the plaintiffs were residents solely 
of Nogales.  
State Provisions for English Language Learners 
Additional costs for educational programs are generally related 
to legitimate differences based on district characteristics, type of 
program in which a student is enrolled, or characteristics of student 
populations such as those with disabilities, students with English 
as a second language (ELLs), and the poor. For nearly 40 years, 
most state school funding programs have recognized the need for 
5
Sutton et al.: English Language Learners and Judicial Oversight: Progeny of Cast
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017
35Educational Considerations, Vol. 39, No. 2, Spring 2012
additional resources to meet minimum education goals for these 
children.48  Typically, state funding for these programs takes one 
of three forms: (1) categorical aid; (2) weighting of the general aid 
formula; or (3) inclusion of ELL funding in the general aid formula. 
Some states use more than one approach. The table compares 
states that provided funding ELL programs in 1999 with those that 
did so in 2009, the latter representing the latest data available. 
Although the same number of states (37) provided funding for 
ELL programs in both years, these do not necessarily represent the 
same states. For example, three states—Alabama, Hawaii, Louisi-
ana—which did not provide funding for ELLs in 1999 now do so. On 
the other hand, Nevada and Virginia, followed the opposite trend, 
and now offer no funding for ELL programs. Finally, eight states had 
no funding for ELL programs in either year. These include: Ken-
tucky, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, and West Virginia. Also, it is important to remember 
that while almost three-fourths of states provide funding for ELL 
programs, we do not know if the levels of funding are sufficient or 
equitably distributed.  
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Given the recent calls for national immigration policy reforms, the 
defeat of the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors 
Act (DREAM) Act by the 111th U.S. Congress,49 the extended 
downturn in the American economy, and the focus of current ELL 
research on financial burdens assumed by state lawmakers, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Horne v. Flores may have signifi-
cant implications for subsequent enforcement of ELL statutory provi-
sions. The primary question before the high court was whether the 
funding remedy originally ordered by the district court should stand 
or whether Arizona school officials should be granted relief from 
the original order if they had demonstrated significant, changed 
circumstances in the Nogales school district. In a 6-3 decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas remanded the 
case back to the district court for the appropriate application of Rule 
60 (b) (5) for compliance within the guidelines of the EEOA.  
A byproduct of the legal proceeding was an issue of whether or not 
federal court orders, established specifically for the Nogales school 
district, could be extended to all Arizona school districts at the 
request of state’s attorney general. The Court declared that if the 
issue were to be raised on remand, then the district court would 
have to determine if there was a basis in federal statutes or in the 
evidence of the case to support such an extension. In addition, the 
Court declared that state officials should not simply ignore court 
rulings in an attempt to use the federal courts as a conduit for 
enacting state policy changes in lieu of the legislature and the will 
of state voters.  Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, 
Justice Breyer’s dissent was of the view that the majority utilized 
new standards to rule in cases pertaining to so-called institutional 
reform litigation, effectuating a more difficult environment for the 
courts to secure enforcement of federal laws which set forth educa-
tion provisions for English Language Learners.   
At first impression, there can be little dispute that the U.S.  
Supreme Court decision in Horne remedied certain serious over-
sights by the district and circuit courts. Critical among these was 
the obvious oversight in the lower courts focusing their changed  
circumstance analysis under Rule 60(b)(5) solely on the state’s 
direct response, or lack thereof, to the district court order without 
regard to the larger question of the current status of ELL education 
in Nogales and the rest of the state. Likewise, there is no logic in 
the petitioners’ argument that a party, especially a state, to an in-
stitutional reform order cannot claim relief from that order based on 
new and changed circumstances simply because they failed to ap-
peal the initial order when it was imposed. Finally, it would appear 
that other than the convenience of the state attorney general and 
other officials, the district court had no basis on which to extend 
its order to the entire state.
That said, the application of Rule 60(b)(5) to the ELL court order 
in Horne raises several troubling issues. Through delays of litigation 
and deliberate avoidance of the eventual court order, the Arizona 
legislature evaded its obligation to address ELL deficiencies in the 
Nogales school district and the rest of the state for over 13 years. 
When finally confronted with court fines for failure to enforce the 
order, the legislature passed a new law that carried no significant 
guarantees of improved ELL education, and then, by stringing to-
gether a series of apparently fortunate externally changed circum-
stances, has now been allowed to seek to vacate the original order 
altogether under the rubric of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
To be certain, the respondents have made considerable arguments 
that the condition of ELL education in the Nogales school district 
today may be significantly better than it was in 1992. Nonetheless, 
it cannot be disputed that the legislature has essentially used the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to argue that evolutionary changes 
over time, as opposed to the specific changes cited in Rufo, caused 
largely without significant state action, along with the passage of a 
single piece of legislation that did not directly address the issues in 
the original litigation, constituted changed circumstances sufficient 
to allow it to challenge a court order it never even attempted to 
comply with. 
As such, Horne v. Flores may have established a troubling prec-
edent found nowhere in the actual ruling. While using Rule 60(b)
(5) to evade federal court orders may require more than simple 
delay and obfuscation, this ruling does suggest that states facing 
court-ordered institutional reform may be able to apply an increas-
ingly flexible standard of changed circumstances to challenge 
such orders, even when the states themselves make no affirmative 
efforts to remedy the deficiencies identified in these orders. In a 
worst case scenario, state legislatures could continue to claim that 
an endless succession of new statutes and school leaders would 
constitute changed circumstances sufficient to defeat, or at the very 
least indefinitely delay, court-ordered remedies for state failures to 
adequately implement federal programs or uphold the constitution-
ally protected rights of school children. 
The ruling in Horne has numerous and mixed policy implications 
for securing equal educational opportunity for ELLs. In permit-
ting an exemption from funding remedies handed down by federal 
courts in the wake of changed circumstance, the decision inherently 
re-emphasized the need for policymakers and educators to apply 
educationally sound instructional strategies to appropriately serve 
students who do not speak English. Conversely, the Arizona legisla-
ture’s failure to respond to or appeal the federal court rulings, with 
little or no consequences, may establish a precedent that clearly 
contravenes the foundation of the rule of law within the American 
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judicial system. On the other hand, one may view the Arizona 
legislature’s contempt for the federal court as a reaffirmation of our 
nation’s federalist framework whereby the reserved powers prin-
ciples established under the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion were applied as intended by its authors. Nevertheless, the mere 
mention of states’ rights juxtaposed to the enforcement of federal 
statutes designed to secure equal opportunity for suspect classes of 
Americans evokes images of national guardsmen, political discord, 
protest, and social unrest against the backdrop of the impotence of 
“with all deliberate speed.” Moreover, recent court applications of 
the Castañeda standards, approving any instructional practice for 
ELLs grounded in a single educational theory, creates a significant 
legal burden for parents who disagree with the education provided 
to their children.50 Consequently, Horne has raised questions about 
the future of federal courts and their ability to provide relief for dis-
senting parents, especially when state lawmakers are in violation of 
federal law pertaining to English Language Learners.  
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